Abstract-The Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is a serious threat to the legitimate use of the Internet. Prevention mechanisms are thwarted by the ability of attackers to forge or spoof the source addresses in IP packets. By employing IP spoofing, attackers can evade detection and put a substantial burden on the destination network for policing attack packets. In this paper, we propose an interdomain packet filter (IDPF) architecture that can mitigate the level of IP spoofing on the Internet. A key feature of our scheme is that it does not require global routing information. IDPFs are constructed from the information implicit in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) route updates and are deployed in network border routers. We establish the conditions under which the IDPF framework correctly works in that it does not discard packets with valid source addresses. Based on extensive simulation studies, we show that, even with partial deployment on the Internet, IDPFs can proactively limit the spoofing capability of attackers. In addition, they can help localize the origin of an attack packet to a small number of candidate networks.
D
ISTRIBUTED Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks pose an increasingly grave threat to the Internet, as evident in recent DDoS attacks mounted on both popular Internet sites and the Internet infrastructure [1] . Alarmingly, DDoS attacks are observed on a daily basis on most of the large backbone networks [2] . One of the factors that complicate the mechanisms for policing such attacks is IP spoofing, which is the act of forging the source addresses in IP packets. By masquerading as a different host, an attacker can hide its true identity and location, rendering sourcebased packet filtering less effective. It has been shown that a large part of the Internet is vulnerable to IP spoofing [3] .
Recently, attackers have increasingly been staging attacks via botnets [4] . In this case, since the attacks are carried out through intermediaries, that is, the compromised "bots," attackers may not utilize the technique of IP spoofing to hide their true identities. It is tempting to believe that the use of IP spoofing is less of a factor. However, recent studies [1] , [5] , [6] show that IP spoofing is still a common phenomenon: it is used in many attacks, including the high-profile DDoS attacks on root DNS servers in early February 2006 [1] . In response to this event, the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee made three recommendations [1] . The first and long-term recommendation is to adopt source IP address verification, which confirms the importance of the IP spoofing problem.
IP spoofing will remain popular for a number of reasons. First, IP spoofing makes isolating attack traffic from legitimate traffic harder: packets with spoofed source addresses may appear to be from all around the Internet. Second, it presents the attacker with an easy way to insert a level of indirection. As a consequence, substantial effort is required to localize the source of the attack traffic [7] . Finally, many popular attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks [8] , [9] , reflector-based attacks [10] , and TCP SYN flood attacks [11] use IP spoofing and require the ability to forge source addresses.
Although attackers can insert arbitrary source addresses into IP packets, they cannot control the actual paths that the packets take to the destination. Based on this observation, Park and Lee [12] proposed the route-based packet filters as a way of mitigating IP spoofing. The idea is that by assuming single-path routing, there is exactly one single path pðs; dÞ between the source node s and the destination node d. Hence, any packet with the source address s and the destination address d that appear in a router that is not in pðs; dÞ should be discarded. The challenge is that constructing such a routebased packet filter requires the knowledge of global routing information, which is hard to reconcile in the current Internet routing infrastructure [13] .
The Internet consists of thousands of network domains or autonomous systems (ASs). Each AS communicates with its neighbors by using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is the de facto interdomain routing protocol, to exchange information about its own networks and others that it can reach [13] . BGP is a policy-based routing protocol in that both the selection and the propagation of the best route to a destination at an AS are guided by some locally defined routing policies. Given the insular nature of how policies are applied at individual ASs, it is impossible for an AS to acquire the complete knowledge of routing decisions made by all other ASs. Hence, constructing route-based packet filters, as proposed in [12] , is an open challenge in the current Internet routing regime.
Inspired by the route-based packet filters [12] , we propose an interdomain packet filter (IDPF) architecture, a routebased packet filter system that can be constructed solely based on the locally exchanged BGP updates, assuming that all ASs employ a set of routing policies that are commonly used today [14] , [15] , [16] . The key contributions of this paper are given as follows: First, we describe how we can practically construct IDPFs at an AS by only using the information in the locally exchanged BGP updates. Second, we establish the conditions under which the proposed IDPF framework works correctly in that it does not discard packets with valid source addresses. Third, to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed architecture, we conduct extensive simulation studies based on AS topologies and AS paths extracted from real BGP data. The results show that, even with partial deployment, the architecture can proactively limit an attacker's ability to spoof packets. When a spoofed packet cannot be stopped, IDPFs can help localize the attacker to a small number of candidate ASs, which can significantly improve the IP traceback situation [7] . In addition, IDPF-enabled ASs (and their customers) provide better protection against IP spoofing attacks than the ones that do not support IDPFs. This should give network administrators incentives to deploy IDPFs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We discuss related work in Section 2. We provide an abstract model of BGP in Section 3. Section 4 presents the IDPF architecture. Section 5 discusses practical deployment issues. We report our simulation study of IDPFs in Section 6. We conclude this paper in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
The idea of IDPF is motivated by the work carried out by Park and Lee [12] , who evaluated the relationship between network topology and the effectiveness of route-based packet filtering. They showed that packet filters constructed based on the global routing information can significantly limit IP spoofing when deployed in just a small number of ASs. In this work, we extend the idea and demonstrate that filters that are built based on local BGP updates can also be effective.
Unicast reverse path forwarding (uRPF) [17] requires that a packet is forwarded only when the interface that the packet arrives on is exactly the same used by the router to reach the source IP of the packet. If the interface does not match, the packet is dropped. Although this is simple, the scheme is limited, given that Internet routing is inherently asymmetric; that is, the forward and reverse paths between a pair of hosts are often quite different. The uRPF loose mode [18] overcomes this limitation by removing the match requirement on the specific incoming interface for the source IP address. A packet is forwarded, as long as the source IP address is in the forwarding table. However, the loose mode is less effective in detecting spoofed packets. In Hop-Count Filtering (HCF) [19] , each end system maintains a mapping between IP address aggregates and valid hop counts from the origin to the end system. Packets that arrive with a different hop count are suspicious and are therefore discarded or marked for further processing. In Path Identification [20] , each packet along a path is marked by a unique Path Identifier (Pi) of the path. Victim nodes can filter packets based on the Pi carried in the packet header. StackPi [21] improved the incremental deployment property of Pi by proposing two new packet marking schemes. In [22] , Li et al. described SAVE, which is a new protocol for networks to propagate valid network prefixes along the same paths that data packets will follow. Routers along the paths can thus construct the appropriate filters by using the prefix and path information. Bremler-Barr and Levy proposed a spoofing prevention method (SPM) [23] , where packets that were exchanged between members of the SPM scheme carry an authentication key that is associated with the source and destination AS domains. Packets arriving at a destination domain with an invalid authentication key (with respect to the source domain) are spoofed packets and are discarded. In the Packet Passport System [24] , a packet that originated in a participating domain carries a passport that is computed based on secret keys shared by the source domain and the transit domains from the source to the destination. Packets carrying an invalid passport are discarded by the transit domains.
In the Network Ingress Filtering proposal described in [25] , traffic originating in a network is forwarded only if the source IP in the packets belongs to the network. Ingress filtering primarily prevents a specific network from being used for attacking others. Thus, although there is a collective social benefit when everyone deploys it, individuals do not receive direct incentives. Finally, the Bogon Route Server Project [26] maintains a list of bogon network prefixes that are not routable on the public Internet. Examples include private RFC 1918 address blocks and unassigned address prefixes. Packets with source addresses in the bogon list are filtered out. However, this mechanism cannot filter out attack packets carrying routable but spoofed source addresses.
BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL AND AS INTERCONNECTIONS
In this section, we briefly describe a few key aspects of BGP that are relevant to this paper (see [27] for a comprehensive description). We model the AS graph of the Internet as an undirected graph G ¼ ðV ; EÞ. Each node v 2 V corresponds to an AS, and each edge eðu; vÞ 2 E represents a BGP session between two neighboring ASs u, v 2 V . To ease the exposition, we assume that there is at most one edge between a pair of neighboring ASs. Each node owns one or multiple network prefixes. Nodes exchange BGP route updates, which may be announcements or withdrawals, to learn of changes in reachability to destination network prefixes. A route announcement contains a list of route attributes associated with the destination network prefix. Of particular interest to us are the path vector attribute as_path, which is the sequence of ASs that this route has been propagated over, and the local_pref attribute that describes the degree of local preference associated with the route. We will use r.as_path, r.local_pref, and r.prefix to denote the as_path, the local_pref, and the destination network prefix of r, respectively. Let r:as path ¼ hv k v kÀ1 . . . v 1 v 0 i. The route was originated (first announced) by node v 0 , which owns the network prefix r.prefix. Before arriving at node v k , the route was carried over nodes v 1 ; v 2 ; . . . ; v kÀ1 in that order. For i ¼ k, k À 1; . . . ; 1, we say that edge eðv i ; v iÀ1 Þ is on the AS path, that is, eðv i ; v iÀ1 Þ 2 r:as path.
When there is no confusion, route r and its AS path r:as path are interchangeably used. For convenience, we also consider a specific destination AS d. All route announcements and withdrawals are specific to the network prefixes owned by d. For simplicity, notation d is also used to denote the network prefixes owned by the AS d. As a consequence, a route r that can be used to reach the network prefixes owned by destination d may simply be expressed as a route to reach destination d.
Policies and Route Selection
Each node only selects and propagates to neighbors a single best route to the destination, if any. Both the selection and the propagation of best routes are governed by locally defined routing policies. Two distinct sets of routing policies are typically employed by a node: import policies and export policies. Neighbor-specific import policies are applied upon routes learned from neighbors, whereas neighbor-specific export policies are imposed on locally selected best routes before they are propagated to the neighbors.
In general, import policies can affect the "desirability" of routes by modifying route attributes. Let r be a route (to destination d) received at v from node u. We denote by importðv uÞ½frg the possibly modified route that has been transformed by the import policies. The transformed routes are stored in v's routing table. The set of all such routes is denoted as candidateRðv; dÞ:
Here, NðvÞ is the set of v's neighbors. Among the set of candidate routes candidateRðv; dÞ, node v selects a single best route to reach the destination based on a well-defined procedure (see [27] ). To aid in description, we shall denote the outcome of the selection procedure at node v, that is, the best route, as bestRðv; dÞ, which reads the best route to destination d at node v. Having selected bestRðv; dÞ from candidateRðv; dÞ, v then exports the route to its neighbors after applying neighbor-specific export policies. The export policies determine if a route should be forwarded to the neighbor, and if so, they modify the route attributes according to the policies (see Section 3.2). We denote by exportðv ! uÞ½frg the route sent to neighbor u by node v after node v applies the export policies on route r.
BGP is an incremental protocol: updates are generated only in response to network events. In the absence of any event, no route updates are triggered or exchanged between neighbors, and we say that the routing system is in a stable state. Formally, Definition 1 (stable routing state). A routing system is in a stable state if all the nodes have selected a best route to reach other nodes and no route updates are generated (or propagated).
AS Relationships and Routing Policies
The specific routing policies that an AS internally employs is largely determined by economics: connections between ASs follow a few commercial relations. A pair of ASs can enter into one of the following arrangements [14] , [16] :
. Provider to customer. In this arrangement, a customer AS pays the provider AS to carry its traffic. It is most common when the provider is much larger in size than the customer. . Peer to peer. In a mutual peering agreement, the ASs decide to carry traffic from each other (and their customers). Mutual peers do not carry transit traffic for each other. . Sibling to sibling. In this arrangement, two ASs provide mutual transit service to each other. Each sibling AS can be regarded as the provider of the other AS. An AS's relationship with a neighbor largely determines the neighbor-specific import and export routing policies. In this paper, we assume that each AS sets its import routing policies and export routing policies according to the rules specified in Tables 1 [15] and 2 [14] , [16] , respectively. These rules are commonly used by ASs on the current Internet. In Table 1 , r 1 and r 2 denote the routes (to destination d) received by node v from neighbors u 1 and u 2 , respectively. customerðvÞ, peerðvÞ, providerðvÞ, and siblingðvÞ denote the set of customers, peers, providers, and siblings of node v, respectively. The import routing policies in Table 1 state that an AS will prefer the routes learned from customers or siblings over the routes learned from peers or providers.
In Table 2 , the columns marked with r1-r4 specify the export policies employed by an AS to announce routes to providers, customers, peers, and siblings, respectively. For instance, export rule r1 instructs that an AS will announce routes to its own networks, and routes learned from customers and siblings to a provider, but it will not announce routes learned from other providers and peers to the provider. The net effect of these rules is that they limit the possible paths between each pair of ASs. Combined together, the import and export policies also ensure the propagation of valid routes on the Internet. For example, combining the import and export policies, we can guarantee that a provider will propagate a route to a customer to other ASs (customers, providers, peers, and siblings). If an AS does not follow the import policies, for example, it may prefer an indirect route via a peer instead of a direct route to a customer. In this case, based on export rule r3, the AS will not propagate the route (via a peer) to a customer to a peer, since the best route (to the customer) is learned from a peer. This property is critical to the construction and correctness of IDPFs (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3). The routing policies in Tables 1 and 2 are incomplete. In some cases, ASs may apply less restrictive policies. For the moment, we assume that all ASs follow the import and export routing policies specified in Tables 1 and 2 and that each AS accepts legitimate routes exported by neighbors. More general cases will be discussed at the end of the next section.
If AS b is a provider of AS a and AS c is a provider of AS b, then we call c an indirect provider of a, and a an indirect Tables 1  and 2 imply that an AS will distribute the routes to direct or indirect customers/siblings to its peers and providers. If eðu; vÞ 2 bestRðs; dÞ:as path, we say that u is the best upstream neighbor of node v for traffic from node s to destination d, and we denote u as u ¼ bestUðs; d; vÞ. For ease of exposition, we augment the AS graph with the relationships between neighboring ASs. We refer to an edge from a provider to a customer AS as a provider-to-customer edge, an edge from a customer to provider as a customer-to-provider edge, and an edge connecting sibling (peering) ASs as siblingto-sibling (peer-to-peer) edge. A downhill path is a sequence of edges that are either provider-to-customer or sibling-tosibling edges, and an uphill path is a sequence of edges that are either customer-to-provider or sibling-to-sibling edges. Gao [14] established the following about the candidate routes in a BGP routing table:
Theorem 1 (see [14] ). If all ASs set their export policies according to r1-r4, a candidate route in a BGP routing table can be any of the following:
1. an uphill path, 2. a downhill path, 3. an uphill path followed by a downhill path, 4. an uphill path followed by a peer-to-peer edge, 5. a peer-to-peer edge followed by a downhill path, or 6. an uphill path followed by a peer-to-peer edge, which is followed by a downhill path.
INTERDOMAIN PACKET FILTERS
In this section, we discuss the intuition behind the IDPF architecture, describe how IDPFs are constructed using BGP route updates, and establish the correctness of IDPFs. After that, we discuss the case where ASs have routing policies that are less restrictive than the ones in Tables 1 and 2 . We shall assume that the routing system is in the stable routing state in this section. We will discuss how IDPFs fare with network routing dynamics in the next section. Let Mðs; dÞ denote a packet whose source address is s (or more generally, the address belongs to AS s) and whose destination address is d. A packet filtering scheme decides whether a packet should be forwarded or dropped based on certain criteria. One example is the route-based packet filtering [12] :
Definition 2 (route-based packet filtering). Node v accepts packet Mðs; dÞ that is forwarded from node u if and only if eðu; vÞ 2 bestRðs; dÞ. Otherwise, the source address of the packet is spoofed, and the packet is discarded by v.
In the context of preventing IP spoofing, an ideal packet filter should discard spoofed packets while allowing legitimate packets to reach the destinations. Since, even with the perfect routing information, the route-based packet filters cannot identify all spoofed packets [12] , a valid packet filter should focus on not dropping any legitimate packets while providing the ability to limit spoofed packets. Accordingly, we define the correctness of a packet filter as follows:
Definition 3 (correctness of packet filtering). A packet filter is correct if it does not discard packets with valid source addresses when the routing system is stable.
Clearly, the route-based packet filtering is correct, because valid packets from source s to destination d will only traverse the edges on bestRðs; dÞ. Computing route-based packet filters requires the knowledge of bestRðs; dÞ on every node, which is impossible in BGP. IDPF overcomes this problem.
IDPF Overview
The following concepts will be used in this section. A topological route between nodes s and d is a loop-free path between the two nodes. Topological routes are implied by the network connectivity. A topological route is a feasible route under BGP if and only if the construction of the route does not violate the routing policies imposed by the commercial relationship between ASs (Tables 1 and 2 ). Formally, let feasibleRðs; dÞ denote the set of feasible routes from s to d. Then, feasibleRðs; dÞ can recursively be defined as follows:
where È is the concatenation operation, for example, fs È fhabi; huvigg ¼ fhsabi; hsuvig. Notice that feasibleRðs; dÞ contains all the routes between the pair that does not violate the import and export routing policies specified in Tables 1 and 2 . Obviously, bestRðs; dÞ 2 candidateRðs; dÞ feasibleRðs; dÞ. Each of the feasible routes can potentially be a candidate route in a BGP routing table. Theorem 1 also applies to feasible routes.
Definition 4 (feasible upstream neighbor)
. Consider a feasible route r 2 feasibleRðs; dÞ. If an edge eðu; vÞ is on the feasible route, that is, eðu; vÞ 2 r:as path, we say that node u is a feasible upstream neighbor of node v for packet Mðs; dÞ. The set of all such feasible upstream neighbors of v (for Mðs; dÞ) is denoted as feasibleUðs; d; vÞ. The intuition behind the IDPF framework is the following: First, it is possible for a node v to infer its feasible upstream neighbors by using BGP route updates. The technique for inferring feasible upstream neighbors is described in the next section. Since bestRðs; dÞ 2 candidateRðs; dÞ feasibleRðs; dÞ, a node can only allow Mðs; dÞ from its feasible upstream neighbors to pass and discard all other packets. Such a filtering will not discard packets with valid source addresses. Second, although network connectivity (topology) may imply a large number of topological routes between a source and a destination, the commercial relationship between ASs and routing policies employed by ASs act to restrict the size of feasibleRðs; dÞ. Consider the example in Fig. 1. Figs. 2a and 2b present the topological routes implied by the network connectivity and feasible routes constrained by routing policies between source s and destination d, respectively. In Fig. 2b , we assume that nodes a, b, c, and d have mutual peering relationship, and that a and b are providers to s. We see that although there are 10 topological routes between source s and destination d, we only have two feasible routes that are supported by routing policies. Of more importance to IDPF is that although the network topology may imply that all neighbors can forward a packet allegedly from a source to a node, feasible routes constrained by routing policies help limit the set of such neighbors. As an example, let us consider the situation at node d. Given that only nodes a and b (but not c) are on the feasible routes from s to d, node d can infer that all packets forwarded by node c and allegedly from source s are spoofed and should be discarded.
It is clear that IDPF is less powerful than route-based packet filters [12] , since the IDPFs are computed based on feasibleRðs; dÞ instead of bestRðs; dÞ. However, feasibleU ðs; d; vÞ can be inferred from local BGP updates, whereas bestUðs; d; vÞ cannot.
Constructing IDPFs
The following lemma summarizes the technique for identifying the feasible upstream neighbors of node v for packet Mðs; dÞ: Lemma 1. Consider a feasible route r between source s and destination d. Let v 2 r:as path and let u be the feasible upstream neighbor of node v along r. When the routing system is stable, exportðu ! vÞ½fbestRðu; sÞg 6 ¼ fg, assuming that all ASs follow the import and export routing policies in Tables 1 and 2 and that each AS accepts legitimate routes exported by neighbors. Lemma 1 states that if node u is a feasible upstream neighbor of node v for packet Mðs; dÞ, node u must have exported to node v its best route to reach the source s.
Proof. Since Theorem 1 applies to feasible routes, a feasible route can be one of the six types of paths in Theorem 1. In the following, we assume that the feasible route r is of type 6, that is, an uphill path followed by a peer-to-peer edge, which is followed by a downhill path. Cases where r is of types 1-5 can similarly be proved. To prove the lemma, we consider the possible positions of nodes u and v in the feasible route: Case 1. Nodes u and v belong to the uphill path. Then, node s must be an (indirect) customer or sibling of node u. From the import routing policies in Table 1 and the export routing policy r1 and the definition of indirect customers/siblings, we know that u will propagate to (provider) node v the reachability information of s.
Case 2. eðu; vÞ is the peer-to-peer edge. This case can similarly be proved as case 1 (based on the import routing policies in Table 1 and the export routing policy r3).
Case 3. Nodes u and v belong to the downhill path. Let eðx; yÞ be the peer-to-peer edge along the feasible route r and note that u is an (indirect) customer of y. From the proof of case 2, we know that node y learns the reachability information of s from x. From the export routing policy r2 and the definition of indirect customers, node y will propagate the reachability information of s to node u, which will further export the reachability information of s to (customer) node v.
t u
Based on Lemma 1, a node can identify the feasible upstream neighbors for packet Mðs; dÞ and conduct IDPF as follows:
Definition 5 (IDPF). Node v will accept packet Mðs; dÞ that is forwarded by a neighbor node u if and only if exportðu ! vÞ ½fbestRðu; sÞg 6 ¼ fg. Otherwise, the source address of the packet must have been spoofed, and the packet should be discarded by node v.
Correctness of IDPF
Theorem 2. An IDPF, as defined in Definition 5, is correct.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider source s, destination d, and a node v 2 bestRðs; dÞ:as path such that v deploys an IDPF. To prove the theorem, we need to establish that v will not discard packet Mðs; dÞ forwarded by the best upstream neighbor u along bestRðs; dÞ. S i n c e bestRðs; dÞ 2 candidateRðs; dÞ feasibleR ðs; dÞ, u is also a feasible upstream neighbor of node v for packet Mðs; dÞ. From Lemma 1, u must have exported to node v its best route to source s. That is, exportðu ! vÞ ½fbestRðu; sÞg 6 ¼ fg. From Definition 5, packet Mðs; dÞ, which is forwarded by node u, will not be discarded by v.t u Notice that the destination address d in a packet Mðs; dÞ does not play a role in an IDPF node's filtering decision (Definition 5). By constructing filtering tables based on the source address alone (rather than both source and destination addresses), the per-neighbor space complexity for an IDPF node is reduced from OðN 2 Þ to OðNÞ, where N ¼ jV j is the number of nodes in the graph (the route-based scheme can achieve the same complexity bound [12] ).
It is worth noting that IDPFs filter packets based on whether the reachability information of a network prefix is propagated by a neighbor and not on how the BGP updates are propagated. As long as ASs propagate network reachability information according to the rules in Tables 1 and 2 , IDPFs work correctly. Moreover, the effectiveness of IDPFs is determined largely by the size of feasibleRðs; dÞ, which is a function of the (relatively static) AS relationships. Hence, how the BGP updates are propagated does not affect both the correctness and the performance of IDPFs. For example, the multiple-path advertisement supported by MIRO [28] will not affect IDPFs' correctness and effectiveness.
Routing Policy Complications
As discussed earlier, the import routing policies and the export routing policies specified in Tables 1 and 2 are not complete. In particular, multihomed ASs may employ less restrictive routing policies for traffic engineering or other purposes [29] . In this section, we first present two traffic engineering examples that do not follow the import and export routing policies specified in Tables 1 and 2 . Then, we discuss how ASs that employ these special traffic engineering practices should control the forwarding of their traffic to ensure the delivery of their traffic in the IDPF framework.
In the first example (see Fig. 3 ), based on [27] ,
, respectively, whereas the link between b and s is used in a reverse manner. To achieve this traffic engineering goal, s informs a to assign the direct customer route r 1 between a and s a lower local preference over the peering route r 2 learned from b to reach the network prefix 204.70/16. That is, r 1 :local pref < r 2 :local pref. This local preference assignment at node a does not follow the import routing policies defined in Table 1 , which requires that an AS should prefer a direct route over an indirect route (through a peer) to reach a customer. Now, consider the example in Fig. 4 . Customer s has a primary provider a and a backup provider b. AS s realizes this goal by using a technique called conditional route advertisement. Prefix 138.39/16 is announced to the backup provider b only if the link to the primary provider a fails. This asymmetric advertisement does not follow the export routing policy r1 defined in Table 2 , which states that a customer will always export to its providers the routes to its own prefixes.
In the examples, the customer s controls the route propagation either by manipulating the local preference of the routes in providers (see Fig. 3 ) or by conditional route advertisement (see Fig. 4 ). As long as the customer AS does not forward packets through the backup route while the primary route is still available, the IDPF architecture will not discard any valid packets. This requirement is not hard to meet, since the customer controls both the route propagation and traffic delivery. The same observation applies to other cases when the routing policies specified in Tables 1 and 2 are not followed. We have the following restricted traffic forwarding policy for the ASs that do not follow the routing policies specified in Tables 1 and 2 .
Restricted traffic forwarding policy. If an AS does not follow the import and export routing policies in Tables 1  and 2 , as long as the primary route is available, the AS should not forward traffic along other (backup) routes.
If each AS on the Internet follows the import routing policies in Table 1 and the export routing policies in Table 2 or the restricted traffic forwarding policy, we can establish the correctness of IDPFs, as defined in Definition 5, on the Internet. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, and we omit it here.
PRACTICAL DEPLOYMENT ISSUES OF IDPFS

Incremental Deployment
IDPFs can independently be deployed in each AS. IDPFs are deployed at the border routers so that IP packets can be inspected before they enter the network. By deploying IDPFs, an AS constrains the set of packets that a neighbor can forward to the AS: a neighbor can only successfully forward a packet Mðs; dÞ to the AS after it announces the reachability information of s. All other packets are identified to carry spoofed source addresses and are discarded at the border router of the AS. In the worst case, even if only a single AS deploys IDPF and spoofed IP packets can get routed all the way to the AS in question, using an IDPF perimeter makes it likely that spoofed packets will be identified and, hence, blocked at the perimeter. Clearly, if the AS is well connected, launching a DDoS attack upon the perimeter itself takes a lot more effort than targeting individual hosts and services within the AS. In contrast, ASs that do not deploy IDPF offer relatively little protection to the internal hosts and services. Therefore, an AS has direct benefits of deploying IDPFs. In general, by deploying IDPFs, an AS can also protect other ASs to which the AS transports traffic, in particular the customer ASs. It can similarly be understood that an IDPF node limits the set of packets forwarded by a neighbor and destined for a customer of the AS.
Handling Routing Dynamics
So far, we have assumed that the AS graph is a static structure. In reality, the graph changes, triggering the generation of BGP updates and altering the paths that ASs use in reaching each other. In this section, we examine how routing dynamics affects the operation of IDPFs. We consider two different types of routing dynamics: 1) those caused by network failures and 2) those caused by the creation of a new network (or recovery from a fail-down network event). Routing dynamics caused by routing policy changes can similarly be addressed, and we omit them here.
IDPFs are completely oblivious to the specifics of the announced routes. Following a network failure, the set of feasible upstream neighbors will not admit more members during the period of routing convergence, assuming that AS relationships are static, which is true in most cases. Hence, for the first type of routing dynamics (network failure), there is no possibility that the filters will block a valid packet. We illustrate this as follows: Consider an IDPF-enabled AS v that is on the best route from s to d. Let u ¼ bestUðs; d; vÞ and U ¼ feasibleUðs; d; vÞ. A link or router failure between u and s can have three outcomes: 1) AS u can still reach AS s, and u is still chosen to be the best upstream neighbor for packet Mðs; dÞ, that is, u ¼ bestUðs; d; vÞ. In this situation, although u may explore and announce multiple routes to v during the path exploration process [30] , the filtering function of v is unaffected. 2) AS u is no longer the best upstream neighbor for packet Mðs; dÞ, and another feasible upstream neighbor u 0 2 U can reach AS s and is instead chosen to be the new best upstream neighbor (for Mðs; dÞ). Now, both u and u 0 may explore multiple routes; however, since u 0 has already announced a route (about s) to v, the IDPF at v can correctly filter (that is, accept) packet Mðs; dÞ, which is forwarded from u 0 . 3) No feasible upstream neighbors can reach s. Consequently, AS v will also not be able to reach s, and v will no longer be on the best route between s and d. No new packet Mðs; dÞ should be sent through v.
The other concern of routing dynamics relates to how a newly connected network (or a network recovered from a fail-down event) will be affected. In general, a network may start sending data immediately following the announcement of a (new) prefix, even before the route has had time to propagate to the rest of the Internet. During the time that the route should be propagated, packets from this prefix may be discarded by some IDPFs if the reachability information has not propagated to them. However, the mitigating factor here is that in contrast to the long convergence delay that follows failure, reachability for the new prefix will be distributed far more speedily. In general, the time taken for such new prefix information to reach an IDPF is proportional to the shortest AS path between the IDPF and the originator of the prefix and independent of the number of alternate paths between the two. Previous work has established this bound to be OðLÞ, with L being the diameter of the AS graph [30] . We believe that in this short timescale, it is acceptable for IDPFs to potentially incorrectly behave (discarding valid packets). It must be noted that during BGP route convergence periods, without IDPF, BGP can also drop packets. One alternative solution is to allow a neighbor to continue forwarding packets from a source within a grace period, after the corresponding network prefix has been withdrawn by the neighbor. In this case, during this short period, IDPFs may fail to discard spoofed attack packets. However, given that most DDoS attacks require a persistent train of packets to be directed at a victim, not discarding spoofed packets for this short period of time should be acceptable. We plan to further investigate the related issues in the future.
In short, IDPFs can handle the routing dynamics caused by network failures, which may cause long route convergence times. IDPFs may, however, drop packets in the network recovery events. We argue that this is not a big problem, since 1) the network recovery events typically have a short convergence time and 2) such events can also cause service disruptions in the original BGP without IDPF.
Overlapping Prefixes
In the IDPF architecture, all ASs along the path from s to d can spoof the source address of s and reach d without being filtered out. The route-based packet filtering has a similar behavior. Due to this property, IDPF is most effective when different ASs own nonoverlapping prefixes. For example, let s be 1.2/16. Then, all ASs along the path from s to d can spoof this prefix. Now, if there is a more specific address s 0 ¼ 1:2:3=24 somewhere in the network, all these ASs can now also spoof s 0 , since a more specific prefix also matches a more general prefix. This situation does not happen when prefixes are not overlapped. Hence, statistically, IDPF is more effective when prefixes are not overlapped. However, due to the ubiquitous use of classless addressing, that is, CIDR [31] , the prefixes owned by different ASs may overlap. The effect of overlapping prefixes will be studied in the next section.
PERFORMANCE STUDIES
In this section, we first discuss the objectives of our performance studies and the corresponding performance metrics. We then describe the data sets and specific settings used in the simulation studies. Finally, detailed results obtained from simulations are presented.
Objectives and Metrics
We evaluate the effectiveness of IDPFs in controlling IP spoofing-based DDoS attacks from two complementary perspectives [12] . First, we wish to understand how effective the IDPFs are in proactively limiting the capability of an attacker to spoof addresses of ASs other than its own. IDPFs do not provide complete protection, and spoofed packets may still be transmitted. Thus, the complementary reactive view is also important. We study how the deployed IDPFs can improve IP traceback effectiveness by localizing the actual source of spoofed packets. Since the (incremental) deployment of IDPFs directly affects the effectiveness, various deployment scenarios are considered. The last dimension of our simulation studies concerns the issue of incentive, that is, how an individual AS will benefit from deploying IDPF on its routers.
We use the performance metrics introduced in [12] in our study. Given any pair of ASs, say, a and t, S a;t is the set of ASs from which an attacker in AS a can forge addresses to attack t. For any pair of ASs, s and t, C s;t is the set of ASs from which attackers can attack t by using addresses that belong to s, without such packets being filtered before they reach t.
To establish a contrast, consider that S a;t quantifies the pool of IP addresses that may be forged by an attacker in a to send packets to t without being stopped. On the other hand, C s;t is defined from the victim's perspective. This quantifies the size of the set of ASs that can forge an address belonging to s in sending packets to t without being discarded along the way. Thus, the latter is a measure of the effort required at AS t to trace the packets to the actual source (there are jC s;t j locations from which the packet could have originated).
Proactive Prevention Metrics
Given the AS graph G ¼ ðV ; EÞ, we define the prevention metric from the point of view of the victim as follows:
V ictimF ractionðÞ ¼ jft : 8a 2 V ; jS a;t j gj jV j :
V ictimF ractionðÞ, which is redefined from [12] , denotes the proportion of ASs that satisfy the following property that if an arbitrary attacker intends to generate spoofed packets, it can successfully use the IP addresses of at most ASs (note that this includes the attacker's own AS). Thus, V ictimF ractionðÞ represents the effectiveness of IDPFs in protecting ASs against spoofing-based DDoS attacks, that is, the fraction of ASs that can be attacked by attackers who can spoof addresses of at most networks. For instance, V ictimF ractionð1Þ, which should be read as the fraction of ASs that can be attacked with packets from at most one AS, describes the immunity to all spoofing-based attacks.
Next, we define a metric from the attacker's perspective. Given G ¼ ðV ; EÞ, AttackF ractionðÞ, as defined in [12] , describes the fraction of ASs from which an attacker can forge addresses belonging to at most ASs (including the attacker's own) in attacking any other ASs in the graph:
AttackF ractionðÞ ¼ jfa : 8t 2 V ; jS a;t j gj jV j :
Intuitively, AttackF ractionðÞ is the strength of IDPFs in limiting the spoofing capability of an arbitrary attacker. For instance, AttackF ractionð1Þ quantifies the fraction of ASs from which an attacker cannot spoof any address other than its own.
Reactive IP Traceback Metrics
To evaluate the effectiveness of IDPFs in reducing the IP traceback effort, that is, the act of determining the true origin of spoofed packets, V ictimT raceF ractionðÞ is defined in [12] , which is the proportion of ASs being attacked that can localize the true origin of an attack packet to be within ASs:
V ictimT raceF ractionðÞ ¼ jft : 8s 2 V ; jC s;t j gj jV j :
For instance, V ictimT raceF ractionð1Þ is simply the fraction of ASs, which, when attacked, can correctly identify the (single) source AS from which the spoofed packet was originated.
Incentives to Deploy IDPF
To formally study the gains that ASs might accrue by deploying IDPFs on their border routers, we introduce a related set of metrics: V ictimF raction IDP F ðÞ, AttackF raction IDP F ðÞ, and V ictimT raceF raction IDP F ðÞ. Let T denote the set of ASs that support IDPFs:
V ictimF raction IDP F ðÞ ¼ jft 2 T : 8a 2 V ; jS a;t j gj jT j ; AttackF raction IDP F ðÞ ¼ jfa 2 V : 8t 2 T ; jS a;t j gj jV j ;
V ictimT raceF raction IDP F ðÞ ¼ jft 2 T : 8s 2 V ; jC s;t j gj jT j :
Note that these are similar to the metrics defined earlier, that is, V ictimF ractionðÞ, AttackF ractionðÞ, and V ictimT raceF ractionðÞ, respectively. However, we restrict the destinations to the set of IDPF-enabled ASs rather than the entire population of ASs.
Note also that V ictimF ractionðÞ, AttackF ractionðÞ, and V ictimT raceF ractionðÞ correspond to 1 ðÞ, 2 ðÞ, and 1 ðÞ in [32] , respectively. We rename them to facilitate easier understanding.
Data Sets
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of IDPFs, we construct four AS graphs from the BGP data archived by the Route Views Project [33] . The first three graphs, denoted G 2003 , G 2004 , and G 2005 , are constructed from single routing table snapshots (taken from the first day of each of the years). Although these provide an indication of the evolutionary trends in the growth of the Internet AS graph, they offer only a partial view of the existing connectivity [14] . In order to obtain a more comprehensive picture, similar to [34] [35] , which caused great churn of the Internet routing system, occurred during this period of time. This had the side effect of exposing more edges and paths than would normally be visible. 1 It is worth pointing out that, even with this effort, the AS graphs that we constructed still may only represent a partial view of the Internet AS-level topology and may not capture all the feasible routes between a pair of source and destination. Thus, we may overestimate the performance of IDPFs, especially for G 2003 , G 2004 , and G 2005 . Table 3 summarizes the properties of the four graphs. In this table, we enumerate the number of nodes, edges, and AS paths that we could extract from the data sets. We also include the size of the vertex cover (VC) for the graph corresponding to individual data sets (the construction will be described later). In Table 3 , we see that G 2004c has about 22,000 more edges or a 65.9 percent increase compared to G 2004 . In addition, the number of observed AS paths in G 2004c is an order of magnitude more than the observed paths in the G 2004 data.
Inferring Feasible Upstream Neighbors
In order for each AS to determine the feasible upstream neighbors for packets from source to destination, we also augment each graph with the corresponding AS paths used for constructing the graph [33] . We infer the set of feasible upstream neighbors for a packet at an AS as follows: In general, if we observe an AS path hv k ; v kÀ1 ; . . . ; v 0 i associated with prefix P , we take this as an indication that v i announced the route for P to v iþ1 , that is, v i 2 feasibleUðP ; v iþ1 Þ, i ¼ 0; 1; . . . ; k À 1.
Determining Routes between Two Nodes
Given an AS graph G ¼ ðV ; EÞ and a subset of nodes T V that deploy the IDPFs, the route that a packet takes from source node s to destination node t will determine the IDPFs that the packet will encounter on the way. Consequently, in order to compute the described performance metrics, we require the 1. Given the lengthy period over which we applied the updates, it is likely that our AS graph includes "stale edges," that is, edges that no longer exist. We ignore this effect in our study, noting that AS relationships are quite stable and, thus, the number is likely to be very small.
TABLE 3
Graphs Used in the Performance Studies exact routes that will be taken between any pairs of nodes. Unfortunately, there is simply no easy way to accurately get this knowledge. In this paper, as a heuristic, we simply use the shortest path on G. When there are multiple candidates, we arbitrarily select one of them. As a consequence, in addition to AS paths, we also include the selected shortest path as a feasible route if it has not been described in the routing updates observed. Note that this knowledge, that is, the best path from an AS to another, is only required in the simulation studies to determine the IDPFs that a packet may encounter on the way from the source to the destination. It is not required in the construction of the IDPFs. Note also that due to the way that feasible neighbors are computed, the effectiveness of IDPFs may artificially be inflated, since the set of feasible neighbors of a node in our simulations is a subset of feasible neighbors of the node in reality (with the complete Internet topology).
Selecting IDPF Nodes
Given a graph G ¼ ðV ; EÞ, the effectiveness of IDPF heavily depends on the filter set, that is, nodes in V for supporting IDPF. We consider two methods for selecting IDPF nodes, which represents two ways that IDPFs can incrementally be deployed. In the first method, denoted as T op, we aggressively select the nodes with the highest degree to deploy IDPF. A special case of this method, denoted as V C, is selecting the IDPF nodes until a V C of G is formed. The number of nodes for forming the V C for each data set is shown in Table 3 . In the second method, denoted as Rnd, we randomly (uniformly) choose the nodes from V until a desirable proportion of nodes are chosen. We will use the notions RndX and T opX to denote the selection of X percent of all nodes for deploying IDPFs using the Rnd and T op methods, respectively. For example, Rnd30 represents selecting 30 percent of nodes to be IDPF nodes using the Rnd method. Note that ASs with high degrees are normally Internet service providers. In particular, tier-1 service providers normally have higher degrees than others. Therefore, the T op method will likely select tier-1 nodes first. Given that the majority of AS paths traverse tier-1 providers, filters deployed at tier-1 providers (or ASs with higher degrees) are more effective in detecting spoofed traffic. On the other hand, the Rnd method may represent a more realistic IDPF deployment scenario, where ASs decide whether to deploy IDPF independently.
Results of Performance Studies
The studies are performed with the Distributed Packet Filtering (dpf) simulation tool [12] . We extended dpf to support our own filter construction based on BGP updates and to deal with overlapping prefixes. We evaluated the performance of IDPFs by using the three performance metrics (V ictimF ractionðÞ, AttackF ractionðÞ, and V ictimT raceF ractionðÞ) under different situations. In addition, we also studied the impact of using BGP updates instead of precise routing information to construct packet filters, investigated the effect of overlapping prefixes in the Internet, and considered IDPFs with and without network ingress filtering. Before we describe the simulation results in detail, we briefly summarize the salient findings:
. IDPFs can significantly limit the spoofing capability of an attacker. For example, with the V C IDPF coverage on the 2004c data set, an attacker in more than 80 percent of ASs cannot successfully launch any spoofing-based attack on the Internet (assuming that no overlapping prefixes are announced [25] helps improve the performance of IDPFs. However, even without network ingress filtering, IDPF is still effective. For example, an attacker still cannot launch any spoofing-based attacks from within more than 60 percent of ASs. Moreover, the AS under attack can localize the true origin of an attack packet to be within 87 ASs. Next, we will present the experimental results. In all experiments, except for the ones in Section 6.3.5, we assume that ASs that deploy IDPFs, being security conscious and network savvy, also implement network ingress filtering [25] .
IDPFs with BGP Updates and Nonoverlapping Prefixes
To begin with, we study the performance of IDPFs with BGP updates and nonoverlapping prefixes. Fig. 5 shows the results on G 2004c with different IDPF node coverages, whereas Fig. 6 shows the results of the IDPF VC coverage on different data sets. Fig. 5a presents the values of V ictimF ractionðÞ for three different ways of selecting the IDPF node on the G 2004c graph: V C and random covers (Rnd50 and Rnd30). Note that V ictimF ractionðÞ indicates the proportion of nodes that may be attacked by an attacker that can spoof the IP addresses of at most nodes. As discussed earlier, IDPFs cannot completely protect ASs from spoofing-based attacks. Hence, we focus on its ability to limit the spoofing capability of attackers. Fig. 5a shows that IDPF is effective in controlling V ictimF ractionðÞ, especially with the IDPF VC coverage. The figure shows that the placement of IDPFs plays a key role in the effectiveness of IDPFs in controlling spoofing-based attacks. For example, with only 17.8 percent of nodes supporting IDPFs, V C outperforms both Rnd30 and Rnd50, although they recruit a larger number of nodes that support IDPFs. In general, it is more preferable for nodes with large degrees (such as big ISPs) to deploy IDPFs. AttackF ractionðÞ illustrates how effective IDPFs are in limiting the spoofing capability of attackers. In particular, AttackF ractionð1Þ is the proportion of nodes from which an attacker cannot launch any spoofing-based attacks against any other nodes. Fig. 5b shows that IDPFs are very effective in this regard. For G 2004c , AttackF ractionð1Þ ¼ 80:8 percent, 59.2 percent, and 36.2 percent for V C, Rnd50, and Rnd30, respectively. Similar trends hold for all the years examined (see Fig. 6b ). This indicates that IDPFs are very effective in limiting the spoofing capability.
Recall that V ictimT raceF ractionðÞ indicates the proportion of nodes that, under attack by packets with a source IP address, can pinpoint the true origin of the packets to be within at most nodes. Fig. 5c shows that all nodes can localize the true origin of an arbitrary attack packet to be within a small number of candidate nodes (28 nodes; see Fig. 6c ) for the V C coverage. For the other two, that is, Rnd30 and Rnd50, the ability of nodes to pinpoint the true origin is greatly reduced. In Fig. 6c, Figs. 7 and 8 show the performance as functions of the percentages of IDPF nodes selected with the T op and Rnd methods, respectively. As expected, in both cases, the effectiveness of IDPF increases as a larger number of nodes deploy IDPF. However, these two figures show that the T op method is significantly more effective than the Rnd scheme, which strongly argues for the deployment of IDPFs in large ISPs with more connectivity. As shown in the figures, even with being deployed only on 1 percent of the most connected nodes, IDPFs can significantly limit the spoofing capability of the attackers and increase the traceback accuracy. Moreover, the performance of IDPFs with 5 percent of all the nodes selected by the T op method is never worse than that with 30 percent of all the nodes selected by the Rnd method in terms of all of the three performance metrics. When the IDPF nodes are randomly selected, they can still significantly limit the spoofing capability (see Fig. 8b ).
Impacts of Precise Routing Information
In this section, we study the impact of the precise global routing information on the performance of IDPFs. The goal is to determine the performance difference between IDPFs and the ideal route-based packet filters [12] with precise global routing information. Notice that in a sense, SAVE [22] is a way to realize route-based packet filtering on the Internet. Its packet filtering performance should be close to route-based packet filtering with precise global routing information. As discussed in Section 6.2.2, we use the shortest path on the AS graph for a given pair of source and destination to approximate the precise route between the pair. As shown in Fig. 9 , the availability of the precise routing information between any pair of source and destination only slightly improves the AttackF ractionðÞ of IDPFs in comparison to the case where BGP update information is used. For example, although about 84 percent of nodes cannot be used by attackers to launch any spoofing-based attacks by relying on the precise routing information, there are still about 80 percent of ASs where an attacker cannot launch any such attacks by solely relying on the BGP update information. However, the traceback ability is more significantly affected. By only relying on the BGP update information, an arbitrary AS can still pinpoint the true origin of an attack packet to be within 28 ASs compared to 7 if precise global routing information is available. Figs. 10 and 11 show the results when the IDPF nodes are selected with the T op and Rnd methods, respectively. For both IDPF node selection schemes, the precise routing information (versus BGP updates) has little impact on AttackF raction and has significant impact on V ictimT raceF raction. These results indicate that using local BGP updates does not significantly affect the IDPFs' ability to limit the spoofing capability of attackers but may affect the traceback accuracy. This conclusion applies to both T op and Rnd deployment scenarios. Fig. 12 shows the impact of overlapping prefixes. In Fig. 12a , we see that overlapping prefixes only have a relatively moderate impact on limiting the spoofing capability of attackers. For example, an attacker of about 50 percent nodes cannot spoof IP addresses of any other nodes. Fig. 12b demonstrates that overlapping prefixes may significantly affect the ability of nodes to pinpoint the true origin of an attack packet. However, we speculate that this is caused by ISPs that announce less specific prefixes that contain more specific prefixes announced by other ASs. To verify this, we introduce another metric V ictimT raceF raction 99 ðÞ, which is defined with respect to 99 percent of jC s;t j. Formally, V ictimT raceF raction 99 ðÞ ¼ jft : 8s 2 V ; P ðjC s;t j Þ ¼ 99%gj jV j :
Impacts of Overlapping Prefixes
V ictimT raceF raction 99 ðÞ can be interpreted as follows: For an attack packet with an arbitrary IP source address, with a 99 percent probability, we can pinpoint the true origin of the packet to be within ASs. Fig. 12c presents the values of V ictimT raceF raction 99 ðÞ. In this figure, we see that for more than 99 percent of IP addresses of attack packets, a node can pinpoint the true origin to be within 79 nodes.
Figs. 13 and 14 show the results when the IDPF nodes are selected with the T op and Rnd methods, respectively. For the T op method, overlapping prefixes slightly affect AttackF ractionðÞ but may significantly change V ictimT raceF ractionðÞ. For example,
V ictimT raceF ractionð1000Þ
changes from 100 percent with nonoverlapping prefixes to 0 percent with overlapping prefixes for all the percentages plotted in Fig. 13 . For the Rnd method, as shown in Fig. 14 , the impact on AttackF raction is negligible, whereas the impact on V ictimT raceF raction is significant. These results are in line with the results for the VC coverage, which indicates that the conclusion applies to both IDPF node selection schemes. 
Deployment Incentives
This section studies the incentives for an AS to deploy IDPFs. The deployment incentive is the key factor that is responsible for the slow deployment of network ingress filtering. Figs. 15 and 16 show the incentive for an AS to deploy IDPFs: the ASs that deploy IDPFs are better protected than those that do not deploy IDPFs. Fig. 15 shows the results when only 5 percent of all nodes (randomly selected) deploy IDPFs, whereas Fig. 16 shows the results when 30 percent of all nodes are IDPF nodes. We show the values of V ictimF raction IDP F ðÞ (the curve marked with IDPF Nodes) and V ictimF ractionðÞ (marked with All Nodes). In Figs. 15 and 16 , we see that in the Rnd30 (Fig. 16 ) case although only about 5 percent of all nodes on the Internet cannot be attacked by attackers that can spoof IP addresses of more than 6,000 nodes, this percentage increases to higher than 11 percent among the nodes that support IDPFs. Moreover, as the value of increases, the difference between the two enlarges. Similarly, although only about 18 percent of all nodes on the Internet can pinpoint the true origin of an attack packet to be within 5,000 nodes, more than 33 percent of nodes that support IDPFs can do so (Fig. 16b) Figs. 15c and 16c compare the spoofing capability of attackers in attacking a general node on the Internet and that support IDPFs. We see that networks supporting IDPFs only gain slightly in this perspective. This can be understood by noting that by deploying IDPFs, an AS protects not only itself but also those to whom the AS transports traffic.
IDPFs with and without Network Ingress Filtering
So far, we have assumed that networks supporting IDPFs also employ network ingress packet filtering [25] . In this section, we examine the implications of this assumption.
In Fig. 17 , we can see that ingress packet filtering indeed has an impact on the effectiveness of IDPFs in limiting the spoofing capability of attackers. However, without network ingress filtering, we still have more than 60 percent of nodes from which an attacker cannot launch any spoofing-based attacks, as compared to 80 percent when ingress filtering is enabled at nodes supporting IDPFs. As shown in Fig. 18 , the impact of network ingress filtering on the effectiveness of IDPFs in terms of reactive IP traceback is not very large. Without ingress filtering, an arbitrary node can pinpoint the true origin of an attack packet to be within 87 nodes, as compared to 28 when networks supporting IDPFs also employ ingress filtering. We have also performed simulations with different IDPF node selection schemes, and the trend in the results is similar to those displayed in Figs. 17 and 18 . In this paper, we have proposed and studied an IDPF architecture as an effective countermeasure to the IP spoofing-based DDoS attacks. IDPFs rely on BGP update messages exchanged on the Internet to infer the validity of source address of a packet forwarded by a neighbor. We showed that IDPFs can easily be deployed on the current BGP-based Internet routing architecture. We studied the conditions under which the IDPF framework can correctly work without discarding any valid packets. Our simulation results showed that, even with partial deployment on the Internet, IDPFs can significantly limit the spoofing capability of attackers. Moreover, they also help pinpoint the true origin of an attack packet to be within a small number of candidate networks, thus simplifying the reactive IP traceback process.
